good fortune [= ‘good luck’] depends only on things external to us;
so someone to whom some good comes without his having
done anything to get it is regarded as more fortunate than
wise men are. In contrast with that, true beatitude [béatitude]
seems to me to consist in a complete contentment of the
mind and an inner satisfaction. People who are the most
favoured by fortune usually don’t have this contentment,
and wise people acquire it with no help from fortune. Thus,
vivere beate, to live in beatitude, is nothing but to have a
mind that is perfectly content and satisfied.
When I think about what the things are quod beatam
vitam efficiat, i.e. that can give us this utter contentment
·that I call ‘beatitude’·, I see that they are of two sorts:
(1) those that depend on us, such as virtue and wisdom,
and (2) those that don’t depend on us, such as honours,
riches, and health. Consider two men who are equally (1)
wise and virtuous, and who differ in that (2) one of them
is shapely, not ill, and affluent while the other is deformed,
unhealthy, and poor; it is certain that the former can be more
completely contented than the latter can.
Still, a small jug can be just as full as a larger one! Taking
the contentment of each man to be
the fullness and the satisfaction of
his desires regulated according to reason,
I don’t doubt that the poorest people, least blest by nature
and fortune, can be entirely content and satisfied just as
others can, although they don’t enjoy as many good things.
That is the only sort of contentment that is in question here;
trying for the other sort would be a waste of time, because it
is not in our own power.
Now, it seems to me that each person can make himself
content, unaided by anything external to him, provided he
respects three conditions that are related to the three rules
of morality that I presented in the Discourse on the Method.
(1) He should always try to use his mind as well as he
can in order to know what he should do or not do in all the
events of life.
(2) He should have a firm and constant resolution to do
whatever reason advises, without being turned away from
that by his passions or appetites. Virtue, I believe, consists
precisely in sticking firmly to this resolution; though I don’t
know that anyone has ever explained the word in this way. . . .
(3) He should bear in mind that while he is living as much
as he can under the guidance of reason, all the good things
that he doesn’t have are one and all entirely outside his
power. This will get him into the habit of not wanting them.
Why is it that we want to be healthier and richer than we are,
but don’t want to have more arms or more tongues than we
have? It is because we know that we can’t by our own efforts
come to have more tongues or arms, while •we imagine that
health and riches are achievable by our exertions or are owed
to our nature—·i.e. are things that it is not natural for us
to lack·. We can rid ourselves of •that opinion by bearing in
mind that since we have always followed the advice of our
reason we have left undone nothing that was in our power,
and that sickness and misfortune are as natural to man as
prosperity and health.
Nothing can impede our contentment except •desire and
•regret or repentance.
·I have explained how the person who
lives by reason can be free of discontenting desires, and now
I add that he can also be free of repentance·. If he always
does whatever his reason tells him to do, then even if events
show him afterwards that he has gone wrong, he will never
have any grounds for repentance, because it was not his
fault.
I should add that beatitude is not incompatible with
every sort of desire—only with desires that are accompanied
by impatience and sadness. Also, it isn’t necessary ·for
beatitude = utter contentment· that our reason should be
free from error. All that is needed is for our conscience
to testify that we have never lacked resolution and virtue
to carry out whatever we have judged the best course. So
virtue by itself is sufficient to make us content in this life.
Nevertheless, because virtue unenlightened by intellect can be false: i.e. our will and resolution to do well can carry us to evil
courses that we think are good,
(1) the contentment that comes from such virtue is not solid,
·i.e. we can’t depend on it to be durable·; and because
we ordinarily oppose this virtue to pleasures, appetites,
and passions,
(2) it’s very difficult to put it into practice. On the other
hand, the right use of reason gives us a true knowledge of
the good ·and thus (1) gives us solid contentment because· it
prevents our virtue from being false; and because the right
use of reason brings virtue into harmony with permissible
pleasures, (2) it makes the practice of virtue quite easy.
·And it also contributes to virtue in a way that I haven’t yet
mentioned, namely·: by giving us knowledge of the condition
of our nature, it restrains our desires in such a way that
one must admit that •man’s greatest happiness depends on
this right use of reason and that therefore •the study that
leads one to it is the most useful occupation one can have.
Certainly it is the most agreeable and delightful.
Descartes
-->
so someone to whom some good comes without his having
done anything to get it is regarded as more fortunate than
wise men are. In contrast with that, true beatitude [béatitude]
seems to me to consist in a complete contentment of the
mind and an inner satisfaction. People who are the most
favoured by fortune usually don’t have this contentment,
and wise people acquire it with no help from fortune. Thus,
vivere beate, to live in beatitude, is nothing but to have a
mind that is perfectly content and satisfied.
When I think about what the things are quod beatam
vitam efficiat, i.e. that can give us this utter contentment
·that I call ‘beatitude’·, I see that they are of two sorts:
(1) those that depend on us, such as virtue and wisdom,
and (2) those that don’t depend on us, such as honours,
riches, and health. Consider two men who are equally (1)
wise and virtuous, and who differ in that (2) one of them
is shapely, not ill, and affluent while the other is deformed,
unhealthy, and poor; it is certain that the former can be more
completely contented than the latter can.
Still, a small jug can be just as full as a larger one! Taking
the contentment of each man to be
the fullness and the satisfaction of
his desires regulated according to reason,
I don’t doubt that the poorest people, least blest by nature
and fortune, can be entirely content and satisfied just as
others can, although they don’t enjoy as many good things.
That is the only sort of contentment that is in question here;
trying for the other sort would be a waste of time, because it
is not in our own power.
Now, it seems to me that each person can make himself
content, unaided by anything external to him, provided he
respects three conditions that are related to the three rules
of morality that I presented in the Discourse on the Method.
(1) He should always try to use his mind as well as he
can in order to know what he should do or not do in all the
events of life.
(2) He should have a firm and constant resolution to do
whatever reason advises, without being turned away from
that by his passions or appetites. Virtue, I believe, consists
precisely in sticking firmly to this resolution; though I don’t
know that anyone has ever explained the word in this way. . . .
(3) He should bear in mind that while he is living as much
as he can under the guidance of reason, all the good things
that he doesn’t have are one and all entirely outside his
power. This will get him into the habit of not wanting them.
Why is it that we want to be healthier and richer than we are,
but don’t want to have more arms or more tongues than we
have? It is because we know that we can’t by our own efforts
come to have more tongues or arms, while •we imagine that
health and riches are achievable by our exertions or are owed
to our nature—·i.e. are things that it is not natural for us
to lack·. We can rid ourselves of •that opinion by bearing in
mind that since we have always followed the advice of our
reason we have left undone nothing that was in our power,
and that sickness and misfortune are as natural to man as
prosperity and health.
Nothing can impede our contentment except •desire and
•regret or repentance.
·I have explained how the person who
lives by reason can be free of discontenting desires, and now
I add that he can also be free of repentance·. If he always
does whatever his reason tells him to do, then even if events
show him afterwards that he has gone wrong, he will never
have any grounds for repentance, because it was not his
fault.
I should add that beatitude is not incompatible with
every sort of desire—only with desires that are accompanied
by impatience and sadness. Also, it isn’t necessary ·for
beatitude = utter contentment· that our reason should be
free from error. All that is needed is for our conscience
to testify that we have never lacked resolution and virtue
to carry out whatever we have judged the best course. So
virtue by itself is sufficient to make us content in this life.
Nevertheless, because virtue unenlightened by intellect can be false: i.e. our will and resolution to do well can carry us to evil
courses that we think are good,
(1) the contentment that comes from such virtue is not solid,
·i.e. we can’t depend on it to be durable·; and because
we ordinarily oppose this virtue to pleasures, appetites,
and passions,
(2) it’s very difficult to put it into practice. On the other
hand, the right use of reason gives us a true knowledge of
the good ·and thus (1) gives us solid contentment because· it
prevents our virtue from being false; and because the right
use of reason brings virtue into harmony with permissible
pleasures, (2) it makes the practice of virtue quite easy.
·And it also contributes to virtue in a way that I haven’t yet
mentioned, namely·: by giving us knowledge of the condition
of our nature, it restrains our desires in such a way that
one must admit that •man’s greatest happiness depends on
this right use of reason and that therefore •the study that
leads one to it is the most useful occupation one can have.
Certainly it is the most agreeable and delightful.
Descartes
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